At the same time, issue ownership theory posits that parties use rhetoric to direct citizens' attention towards issues the party "owns," in the sense that the party has developed a long-term reputation for competently handling these issues. In particular, the theory posits that mainstream left-wing parties -long-term advocates of the welfare state -enjoy positive reputations for administering government programs pertaining to public health, unemployment insurance, family assistance, old-age pensions, and public housing, so that voters who prioritize these issues tend to support leftist parties because voters trust them to competently address these domains. 3 This implies that mainstream 1 Fernandez-Vazquez 2014a; Fernandez-Vazquez 2014b; Adams et al. 2011; Adams et al. 2014; Fortunato and Stevenson 2013. In particular, Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) demonstrate that citizens infer that coalition partners' issue positions are more similar than is implied by the policy tone of their election manifestos.
leftist parties benefit from emphasizing social welfare issues, because this emphasis increases the public salience of the issues these parties own. 4 To date, we are unaware of studies that jointly consider how governing party support responds to governments' rhetoric versus their concrete actions. That is what we present here. We argue that because governing parties -unlike opposition partiesare in position to enact policies, citizens prioritize governments' deeds over their words, so that -contra issue ownership theory -governing parties' support does not respond to their rhetorical issue emphases -the No Rhetorical Effects Hypothesis. We also review the conflicting arguments on how party support responds to governments' concrete actions with respect to social welfare spending. We then present time-series, crosssectional analyses of data on government support, government rhetoric (in executive speeches) and government spending (from OECD data) from Britain, Spain, and the United States, that support our No Rhetorical Effects Hypothesis. However our analyses identify strong negative effects of social welfare spending on government support, for both left-and right-wing governments.
Our findings pertain to governing parties' electoral strategies and to mass-elite linkages. Our finding that leftist governments -in common with right-wing governments -are punished for social welfare spending pertains to the well-known "costs of governing", i.e., governments' tendencies to lose public support over time. 5 Scholars have identified diverse factors that contribute to the costs of governing, including competence, performance in office, and real world conditions pertaining to the economy or 4 An exception to this generalization may occur when some domestic or international crisis (such as a terrorist attack) overshadows social welfare issues.
5 E.g., Rose and Mackie 1983; Paldam 1991. war. 6 To these considerations we add a new factor pertaining to left-wing governments:
namely, that the budgeting strategy that optimizes leftist governments' short-term support -which is to cut social welfare spending -is impractical in the long term. Not only do leftist governing elites plausibly sincerely support social welfare spending -so that cutting such spending depresses their policy-based utilities 7 -but in the long run governing parties that renege on their policy pledges may undermine their credibility with the public, and alienate their core supporters. 8 In this sense, leftist governments may be "prisoners of their ideologies", 9 in that the long-term imperative to faithfully act on their social welfare rhetoric undermines their short-term political support. This finding suggests yet another dilemma for social democratic parties in the 21 st century, as they confront strategic incentives to adapt their political messages and construct new electoral coalitions.
10
In future research we hope to extend our study to additional issue areas where government action is not defined primarily in terms of spending levels -such as environmental and multicultural issues -and also to the issue areas "owned" by the mainstream right, notably crime and defence. For now, our analyses of the social welfare issues associated with the mainstream left suggest that the mass public responds to governments' actions, not their words. 6 E.g., Green and Jennings 2012; Sigelman and Kathleen 1983; Kernell 1978; Powell and Whitten 1993. 7 E.g., Strom 1990. 8 E.g., Przeworski and Sprague 1986. 9 Adams et al. 2006 . 10 Kitschelt 1994.
How Public Support Responds to Governments' Policy Rhetoric and to their Actual Budget Allocations: Hypotheses on the Costs of Governing
The "cost of governing" phenomenon, 11 whereby governing parties tend to lose support over time, has generated an extensive literature which has developed three well-known explanations. The "pendulum swing" model 12 argues that parties gain governing status in part due to short-term factors such as economic conditions, political crises, and scandals, that propel these parties to positive electoral outcomes that help them capture the government, but because these forces recede over time (a form of regression to the mean) governing parties tend to lose popular support as time passes. A second model, known as the 'unpopularity' model, predicts that the more unpopular the government before elections the more likely it will be replaced at the next election 13 and can be compared to the political business cycle. 14 A third model is expectation/disillusion theory, 15 that governments lose support because they fail to meet expectations they raised during the election campaign.
We 
How voters (do not) react to government speech: The No Rhetorical Effects Hypothesis
We first consider how citizens respond to governments' policy rhetoric. With respect to this question, issue ownership theory posits that parties compete by emphasizing the issue domains they "own," in the sense that voters associate a focal party with particular issues they believe the party can competently address. 16 In particular, the theory posits that mainstream, center-right parties, notably conservative and Christian Democratic parties, enjoy public images for competence on issues pertaining to crime, national defense, and (arguably) immigration, whereas mainstream leftist parties, such as labor and social democratic parties, enjoy superior images for managing social welfare domains including healthcare, public housing, family assistance, unemployment, and old age pensions. 17 Issue ownership theory implies that parties benefit when the issues they own increase in public salience, so that parties have electoral incentives to emphasize their core issues in order to direct voters' attention to these domains. Indeed, empirical research by Hobolt et al. documents that political parties' policy rhetoric influences citizens' is-16 E.g., Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Green and Hobolt 2008. 17 We note that niche parties of the left and right are associated with different issue areas, in particular green parties enjoy positive images with respect to environment issues while radical right parties are associated with issues pertaining to nationalism and immigration (Wagner and Meyer 2014 Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Walgrave et al. 2012. 20 Epp et al. 2014. 21 Fernandez-Vazquez and Somer-Topcu forthcoming.
The second reason why voters may discount governments' policy rhetoric is that opposition parties frequently undercut this rhetoric by publicly questioning its sincerity. Osborne's discussion of the government's budget, asserting "Never has the gap between the Chancellor's rhetoric and the reality of peoples' lives been greater than it was today…This is a budget people won't believe from a government that is not on their side" (The Independent, March 18, 2015) . 24 Fernandez-Vazquez 2014b.
How voters react to government spending: Conflicting arguments and no clear prediction
In contrast to the prediction that voters discount government rhetoric, theoretical considerations offer conflicting predictions about the effects of government spending. In particular, there are arguments that voters will not respond to government spending; arguments that voters will reward increased social welfare spending; and alternative arguments that voters will punish increased welfare spending. The argument that citizens will not react to social welfare spending is that voters are "motivated reasoners" whose partisan loyalties distort their perceptions of government spending to conform to their pre-existing policy preferences, i.e., citizens who support (oppose) the government for other reasons perceive that government budgets match (diverge from) these supporters' spending preferences, regardless of the facts. In this regard, Bartels shows that partisanship notably skewed American citizens' retrospective perceptions of the Reagan administration's budget allocations. 25 We note that the "perceptual screen" that partisanship exerts on perceived government spending is part of a wider phenomenon, whereby partisanship also influences citizens' perceptions of the economy. 26 And while one might expect political independents to form more impartial estimates of government spending levels, extensive research documents that non-aligned voters display lower levels of political interest and awareness than committed partisans, 27 so that the constituency best suited to impartially assess government spending is also the least likely to acquire this information. 25 
Data, Measurement, and Case Selection
We analyse our research questions using time-series, cross-sectional data on government support, governments' social welfare rhetoric, and their social welfare spending from United States orities as well as more specific measures that it plans to address. 43 Budge et al. 2001. 44 For spending data we rely on the OECD Social Expenditure Database. The "Welfare" category includes the subcategories old age, survivors, pensions, incapacity related, family, and other social policy areas.
the literature on how party ideology affects public spending and on policy responsiveness. 45 Below we report robustness checks using an alternative measure of government policy, the social welfare generosity index, that some scholars use in preference to social welfare spending. [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] compared to the final González government (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , and then increased again following the switch to the left-wing Zapatero government in 2004. Finally, note that because our Spanish data series ends in 2009 it does not cover the period of "austerity" budgets, featuring sharp social welfare benefit cuts, that were subsequently introduced in Spain (as a condition for receiving international loans) in response to the dramatic contraction of the domestic economy that coincided with the worldwide economic recession. We return to this point in the conclusion.
Finally, in our analysis we will estimate -in addition to analyses over all governments -separate models on right-wing and left-wing governments, because the theoretical arguments outlined above suggest that the effects of social welfare emphasis on government support may depend on the government's ideology. We consider the British 
Model Specification
In our analyses we confront variation across countries and over time. Pure OLS is problematic for time-series cross-sectional models because it assumes that errors have equal variance (homoskedasticity) and are independent over time (no serial correlation) 48 In particular, there is no government support data available for Denmark between 1991 and 2010.
49 Powell and Whitten 1993; Shugart and Carey 1992. 50 We note that three of the Spanish governments in our study, González IV (1993 -1996 welfare spending (t)] which denotes the change in current welfare spending compared to welfare spending in the previous year. 59 We specify the following basic model to be estimated yearly over all the governments in our study, and then separately on all left-wing governments and then on all right-wing governments: 
Results
We first estimated the parameters of equation 1 on the full set of 79 government support changes in our data set, and we then re-estimated these models separately on the 38 support changes for left-wing governments, and then on the 41 support changes for right-wing governments. Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the observed values of the variables in our data set, computed over all governments (column 1); left-wing governments (column 2); and right-wing governments (column 3). The mean value of our dependent variable, [⧍government support (t)], is -0.74% when averaged over all governments, i.e., the governments in our study on average lost roughly three-quarters of one percent of their support at the current year compared to the previous year, consistent with the well-known cost of governing discussed earlier. In addition, the percentages displayed in columns 2-3 of Table 1 However we have re-estimated all our models while omitting these three country-years, and these analyses support the same substantive conclusions we report below. Before turning to effects pertaining to social welfare rhetoric and spending, note that the coefficient on the variable [government support (t -1)] is negative and significant in all three sets of analyses while the coefficient on the intercept is positive and sig- 61 We have re-estimated all of our models with robust standard errors, and these estimates support the same substantive conclusions we report below.
nificant, which implies a "regression to the mean" in government support, i.e., when government support was unusually high (low) at the previous time period, then support tended to subsequently decline (increase) at the current period. 62 This pattern is found in various social settings and may reflect ceiling/floor effects or underlying dynamic processes. 63 The ceiling/floor effect is that aggregate government support is bounded by the values 0% and 100%, so that when lagged government support was unusually low (high) it has more room to grow (decline) at the current period. The dynamic process is that when a government's lagged support was unusually low (high) this may reflect the effects of short-term factors such as political scandals or the government's handling of crisis situations, which tend to recede over time.
We now consider the social welfare rhetoric and spending effects that interest us.
If government support responds to social welfare rhetoric, we would expect significant coefficient estimates on either (or both) of the variables [⧍govt. welfare speech (t)] and
[govt. welfare speech (t -1)]. However the estimates on both variables are near zero and statistically insignificant, in all three sets of analyses (those over all governments, over left-wing governments, and over right-wing governments). These estimates support our No Rhetorical Effects Hypothesis, that government support does not respond to governments' social welfare rhetoric. Indeed, the coefficient estimates on these variables, in combination with their standard errors, imply that we can rule out -at conventional levels of statistical significance -the hypothesis that social welfare rhetoric exerts substantively significant effects on government support. The coefficient estimate on the 62 Note that this interpretation holds when the error-correction term is negative and falls between 0 and -1, when equilibrium shocks are corrected at a gradual rate (Jennings and John 2009, 841-842) . 63 See, e.g., Barnett et al. 2005. [government welfare speech (t -1)] variable is exactly zero in the analyses over all governments (see column 1 of Thus even if the true effects of social welfare rhetoric lie at one of the boundaries of the 95% confidence interval on our parameter estimate, this rhetoric only modestly affects government support.
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By contrast, our estimates imply that increased social welfare spending depresses government support, in that the coefficient estimate on the variable [govt. welfare spending (t -1)] is negative and statistically significant, denoting that the higher the government's lagged social welfare spending the more government support declines at the current time period, i.e., the public punishes governments for higher levels of social welfare spending. The coefficient estimate over all governments, -1.43 (p < .01), implies that the difference between a lagged social welfare spending level of 17.6% of GDP (the mean 64 Computations on the [⧍govt. welfare speech (t)] variable, which denotes the yearly change in social welfare rhetoric, have similar substantive implications: namely, that if the true value of the variable coefficient lies anywhere inside its 95% confidence interval, which is [-.10, +.20], then realistic over-time changes in social welfare rhetoric will not shift government support by more than about 1.5%.
for the governments in our data set) and lagged social welfare spending of 20.3% of GDP (one standard deviation above the mean) depresses expected government support by roughly 3.8 percentage points at the current time period, a substantively significant effect. 65 The parameters on the [govt. welfare spending (t -1)] variable estimated over left-wing governments (-1.32, p < .01) and right-wing governments (-1.87, p < .05) are similar, suggesting that social welfare spending depresses support for both types of governments. the current year -compared to the previous year -for levels of lagged social welfare spending above 17.1% of GDP, and that moreover this projected loss is statistically significant when lagged social welfare spending is above 18% of GDP (which is at the 50th percentile of the values in our data set) -projections that substantiate the well-known costs of governing effect. Second, the figure illustrates how higher lagged social welfare spending substantially exacerbates these projected vote losses, while lower levels of lagged spending mitigate these losses. Indeed when lagged social welfare spending falls below 15.7% of GDP, then governments enjoy statistically significant projected vote gains.
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Figure 3. Effects of Lagged Social Welfare Spending on Government Support Changes
Notes. The figure displays the predicted effect of the [government welfare spending (t -1)] variable on the [⧍government support (t)] variable, computed for the coefficient estimates reported in column 1 of Table 2 . The dotted lines denote 95% confidence intervals.
Finally, we also estimate negative -albeit statistically insignificant -coefficients on the change in social welfare spending variable, [⧍govt. welfare spending (t)], in all three sets of analyses (those on all governments, on left-wing governments, and on rightwing governments). These negative coefficients are consistent with our conclusion that voters punish governments for higher social welfare spending. That the coefficient estimates on the [⧍govt. welfare spending (t)] variable are insignificant may reflect the modest variation in the values of the [⧍govt. welfare spending (t)] variable in our data set (see Table 1 above), i.e., that governments' social welfare spending changes are typically incremental, which inflates the standard errors on these parameter estimates. We estimated the parameters of additional models in order to assess the robustness of our findings.
Robustness checks
67 First, we estimated the parameters of an economic effects model, which controls for national levels of unemployment and inflation via the inclusion of a misery index that sums these two variables, along with the yearly change in this index.
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An extensive literature documents that voters hold governing parties accountable for economic conditions, 69 particularly in single-party governments such as those in Britain and Spain during the period of our analysis, 70 so that we expect that higher levels of unemployment and inflation -along with short-term increases in these factors -will depress government support. Column 1 in Table 3 ter estimates on the misery index imply that the public punishes governments for in- 67 We thank three anonymous reviewers for suggesting many of the robustness checks we discuss here.
68 Data from the OECD are used for unemployment as percentage of civilian labour force and inflation as consumer prices as percentage change on the same period of the previous year.
69 E.g., van der Brug et al. 2007; Duch and Stevenson 2008. 70 Powell and Whitten 1993. creases in unemployment and inflation, in that the estimate on the lagged misery index is negative and significant (-0.22, p < .05).
Next, we analysed a model that includes an alternative indicator of government social welfare policy, namely the social welfare generosity index, which is a measure of the generosity of government social insurance benefits including unemployment insurance, sick pay insurance, and public pensions. 71 The generosity index, which is widely used in comparative studies of social welfare policy, 72 is arguably a more relevant measure of government policy than the level of social welfare spending, since the latter is influenced by factors such as the unemployment rate and the population of pensioners, that can cause overall government spending to vary even if the underlying social welfare policies are stable. Column 2 in Table 3 73 We downloaded yearly data on governments' social welfare generosity from Scruggs et al. (2014) , available at http://cwed2.org/. We note that these data stop in 2011, so that we lose one year from each country so that the number of cases in these analyses drops from N=79 to N=76. Finally, we performed additional analyses to assess the robustness of our findings. First, we re-estimated our models while including controls designed to evaluate whether governing parties were punished when their social welfare spending did not match their (lagged) social welfare rhetoric. Second, we estimated models where we included additional lags for government spending and speech. Third, in response to previ-ous research suggesting that government support varies based on the electoral cycle, 74 we included controls for the length of time until the next election. Fourth, we estimated models that included separate controls for unemployment and inflation, in order to parse out different effects of these economic variables. Finally, to investigate the possibility that causal processes differ across countries -in particular that there are differences in the US presidential system, versus the British and Spanish parliamentary systems -we re-estimated our modes while omitting one country at a time from our analyses. These analyses, which we report in supplementary materials posted on our web site, continue to support our substantive conclusions.
In toto, our results consistently suggest that voters punish governments for higher levels of social welfare spending, and that these effects are both statistically and substantively significant. This conclusion extends to separate analyses of left-wing and rightwing governments, and to analyses that control for economic conditions and for alternative measures of governments' social welfare spending policies (as well as the additional robustness checks summarized above). By contrast, we find no evidence that government support responds to the government's social welfare rhetoric, and indeed our analyses allow us to rule out -at conventional levels of statistical significance -the hypoth- 
Conclusion and Discussion
The question of whether citizens evaluate governments based on their words or their deeds has normative and empirical implications. The normative question is whether citizens should prioritize political actors' actions over their rhetoric. The empirical question is: Do citizens prioritize actors' concrete behaviour over their rhetoric? We address the latter question here, in the context of the mass public's evaluations of the government's social welfare rhetoric and spending. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to evaluate how citizens jointly respond to governments' words and to their deeds.
We have presented theoretical arguments that the public will not respond to government rhetoric -the No Rhetorical Effects Hypothesis -first because citizens recognize that political actors are motivated to broadcast publicly appealing "cheap talk" regardless of their true policy intentions, second because in the case of governing parties (but not opposition parties) citizens can evaluate the government's concrete actions, which speak louder than their words. However, with respect to the government actions we study here -namely social welfare spending -we believe theory provides limited guidance about how the public will respond (positively or negatively), because theoretical arguments point in conflicting directions. This issue is important because social welfare is a major component of government budgets in all western democracies, and moreover it is a core competency domain of center-left political parties. Green-Pedersen et al. 2015. 77 Fernandez-Vazquez 2014a; Fernandez-Vazquez 2014b; Adams et al. 2011; Adams et al. 2014. 78 Karreth et al. 2013. We believe our finding that the mass public evaluates governments based on their deeds, not their words, has positive implications for representative democracy.
This voter decision rule appears normatively desirable, first because government actions arguably constitute "revealed preferences" that speak louder than their words, second because it implies that governments have limited abilities to distract citizens from unpopular policies via clever public rhetoric. Government accountability is arguably maximized when the public holds the government accountable for its actions. We find that in the social welfare domain, the public fulfils this desideratum.
Our study comes with caveats that also raise questions for future research. First, our failure to detect a relationship between governments' social welfare rhetoric and public support does not prove that no such relationship exists: absence of evidence does not constitute evidence of absence. In future research we plan to extend our empirical analyses to other countries and time periods, as additional Comparative Agenda Project executive speech codings are released. Such extensions may yet uncover positive evidence that the public responds to government rhetoric. At the same time, we have outlined theoretical arguments that cast doubt on whether citizens will respond to the government's words, given that the public can alternatively react to the government's concrete actions. Moreover, our analyses allow us to rule out, at conventional levels of statistical significance, the proposition that realistic changes in social welfare rhetoric exert substantively meaningful effects on government support.
Second and related, the lack of evidence that aggregate public support responds to governments' social welfare rhetoric does not rule out individual-level effects. To the extent that some citizens respond positively -but others negatively -to social welfare rhetoric, these individual-level effects may roughly cancel out. In future research we plan to analyze whether citizens' reactions to governments' social welfare rhetoric/spending are mediated by individual traits such as citizens' issue priorities, their sociodemographic characteristics, and their policy beliefs. In particular, citizens holding leftist social welfare views plausibly react much more positively to pro-welfare rhetoric/spending than do those on the right. However we believe our aggregate-level findings matter regardless of these individual-level processes, because governments are plausibly more concerned with how their behaviour affects their aggregate support than with the breakdowns across different subconstituencies. Finally, as we noted in the introduction, we hope to extend our analyses to issues such as the environment, multiculturalism, and European integration, where government action is not defined primarily in terms of spending levels, and also to the issue areas "owned" by the mainstream right, notably crime and defence. We also hope to extend our study to other countries where government responsibility is less clear than in the cases of Britain, Spain, and the United States, as additional data on government speeches and popularity become available.
Such analyses might also clarify the relationship between public support and governments' social welfare/rhetoric across varieties of economic and social welfare regimes.
Third, the countries and time periods we analyze do not include instances of the types of savage social welfare spending cuts that governments in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and -after the time period of our study -Spain enacted, in response to the Eurozone economic crisis that began in [2008] [2009] . We have analyzed a set of countries (Britain, Spain, and the United States) during periods of (mostly) "normal" government budgets, when yearly changes in social welfare spending were typically incremental, and when, moreover, national governments were not constrained to slash spending to conform to the terms of international financial assistance packages, as occurred in Greece, Ireland, and (eventually) Spain. We make no claims that our findings extend to these types of extraordinary economic and political contexts. At the same time, we believe the collapse in domestic support for some European governments that slashed social welfare spending after 2009 does not contradict our conclusion that welfare spending cuts enhance government support, first because in several cases the government's support collapsed before it slashed welfare spending but after the national economy contracted, suggesting that support collapsed largely due to the severe economic downturn, not government budgets. Second, as discussed above the recent social welfare cuts in Greece, Portugal, and elsewhere were qualitatively different to those we analyze in our study, not only in their severity but because these governments were perceived as acting under pressure from international creditors, which weakened these governments' public images for independence and leadership ability.
Finally, our conclusion that support does not respond to government rhetoric does not necessarily imply that citizens similarly discount opposition party rhetoric.
Whereas citizens may privilege the government's deeds over its words, citizens may weigh the opposition's rhetoric because they feel they have no practical alternative: opposition parties often have no meaningful influence on government policy outputs, so that citizens may fall back on opposition parties' words instead.
In this paper we have analysed how government support in Britain, Spain, and the United States responds to the government's social welfare rhetoric, and to its social welfare spending. We find that government support is not meaningfully related to its rhetoric, but that governments that spend more on social welfare programs see their support decline, regardless of these governments' ideologies (left or right). This "social welfare spending penalty" poses strategic problems for left-wing governing parties,
